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Arguably the most influential models of human decision-making today are based on
the assumption that two separable systems – intuition and deliberation – underlie the
judgments that people make. Our recent work is among the first to present neural
evidence contrary to the predictions of these dual-systems accounts. We measured
brain activations using functional magnetic resonance imaging while participants
were specifically instructed to either intuitively or deliberately judge the authenticity
of emotional facial expressions. Results from three different analyses revealed both
common brain networks of activation across decision mode and differential activations
as a function of strategy adherence. We take our results to contradict popular dual-
systems accounts that propose a clear-cut dichotomy of the processing systems, and
to support rather a unified model. According to this, intuitive and deliberate judgment
processes rely on the same rules, though only the former are thought to be characterized
by non-conscious processing.
Keywords: intuition, deliberation, unimodel, dual-system model, orbitofrontal cortex
Introduction
The face reveals the state of the heart.
Dante Aligheri
Imagine the genuine smile spreading across a father’s face as he holds his newborn child in
his arms for the ﬁrst time. To intuitively judge this smile as an honest display of bliss seems
elementary. Now picture a young bride-to-be, smiling politely as she receives her mother’s outdated
wedding gown to wear at her own wedding. Intuitively judging this smile as dishonest does not
pose a big challenge (for most). At times people make judgments intuitively, that is, “quickly
and eﬀortlessly, seemingly popping out of nowhere, without much conscious awareness of their
origins or of the manner of their formation” (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 97). At other
times, people arrive at their judgments using deliberation, requiring a higher cognitive load
and relying on a thorough thought process accessible to (conscious) awareness. Ekman (2006),
one of the pioneers of the ﬁeld of emotional face perception, devised an example of this: he
constructed a training tool to teach people how to detect miniscule changes in facial conﬁguration
so that they could learn to distinguish an honest from a deceitful expression. Judging facial
expressions is part and parcel of our daily interactions, and their correct interpretation is essential
for life in social groups. At times, making judgments to glean meaning from the expressions on
faces of others seems intuitive (e.g., in everyday face-to-face communication); at other times,
it can be deliberate (e.g., when training to recognize deception, as described above). So-called
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dual-systems accounts propose that two qualitatively and
architecturally distinct cognitive processing systems underlie
judgments in one form or another (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Evans,
2008) In contrast, uniﬁed approaches propose that intuitive
and deliberate judgments rely on the same (or similar) rules,
while diﬀering only along a dimension of consciousness (e.g.,
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011). Both conceptualizations and
the neural predictions that can be derived from them shall
be explained in detail below. The present contribution set out
to test whether one of the two kinds of approaches better
accounts for the neuroimaging data in a face perception task. We
chose to use a brain imaging technique to probe these concepts
of cognitive judgment strategies, since functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) is a method ideally suited to compare
and contrast neural underpinnings of cognitive processes. In
other words, we tested whether—and if so, in what way—the
neural substrates underlying a fast and subconscious processing
strategy (intuitive) diﬀer from those at the basis of a deliberate
one, in an expression authenticity judgment task. Therein
participants of instruction groups (“intuitive”/“deliberate”) were
presented with positive and negative emotional facial expressions
of men and women of diﬀerent age groups. Participants’ task was
to judge the authenticity of these emotional facial expressions as
“authentic” or “not authentic.”
Over the last three decades, the number of theoretical
frameworks suggesting that judgments can be formed via two
qualitatively distinct processes or systems has grown signiﬁcantly
(Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003;
Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Evans, 2008). Many of these dual-
systems accounts have attributed speciﬁc, dissimilar qualities
to intuitive and deliberate judgments. Intuitive judgments are
assumed to be quick, associative, not conscious, eﬀortless,
heuristic, and—by some—error prone. Deliberate judgments, on
the other hand, are in much of this research assumed to be just
the opposite; particularly, they are assumed to be slow, rule-
based, conscious, eﬀortful, analytic, and rational. The literature
on judgment and decision-making in (cognitive) psychology,
as well as recently in neuroscience and neuro-economics, is
abundant with empirical ﬁndings interpreted in support of
the dualistic paradigm (e.g., McClure et al., 2004; Lieberman,
2007); this trend has not gone unchallenged, however. Keren
and Schul (2009, p. 546), for example, call for judgment and
decision-making researchers to explore “the natural complement
of dual-system theories, namely, a unimodel.” Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer (2011), accepting that invitation, suggest a uniﬁed
theory of judgment, an “adaptive toolbox” of heuristics and other
rules. According to their proposed framework, both intuitive and
deliberative judgments are in fact based on rules and, crucially,
the very same rules can underlie both sorts of judgment. One
example is the recognition heuristic, which describes how people
choose options they recognize over unrecognized ones: in the
classic “city size task,” participants may employ the recognition
heuristic by judging one of the two presented cities as larger
in population size because they recognize its name. Thus the
decision criterion (recognition heuristic) can be used intuitively
[i.e., without (consciously) deliberating about the correlation
between recognition and criterion, in this case, city size]. Yet
the same heuristic can also be used deliberatively (i.e., with
forethought and cognitive eﬀort), pondering, for example, on
that same correlation, but perhaps as a strategy for investing
in stocks (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2009). Thus the processes
are not clearly separate judgment mechanisms; instead, the
crucial distinction between the two processes becomes whether a
decision process is used consciously, as in deliberate judgments,
or non-consciously, as in intuitive judgments. Put diﬀerently,
in the adaptive toolbox framework, the term “unimodel” does
not mean to imply that there is only one process, but that
there is a repertoire of several processes, which can be and are
used, consciously and unconsciously, in both judgment types
(Gigerenzer et al., 2011). Note that the intuitive decision maker
is not aware of the ongoing cognitive processes, in the sense that
she can report on them – neither on the cue(s) she is using (e.g.,
recognition) nor on the way in which the cue(s) are processed –
she is, however, aware of a feeling indicating which option to
choose or which action to pursue. This consciously experienced
(subjective/gut) feeling is suggested to result from the ongoing
cognitive processes and signiﬁes intuitive judgments (Volz and
Zander, 2014).
We believe that this makes a task requiring participants to
judge emotional facial expressions a prime example to examine
the mental mechanisms underlying intuitive and deliberate
judgment strategies and directly test the neural predictions
derived from dual-systems theories as well as the unimodel.
If the dual-systems assumption more closely represents
a mapping of an individual’s judgment strategy, we would
expect to ﬁnd architecturally distinct neuro-cognitive processing
systems for the two sorts of judgments: following the “Social
Cognitive Neuroscience” approach (Lieberman et al., 2002;
Lieberman, 2007), we would expect to see activation within
the amygdala, basal ganglia, and lateral temporal cortex for
participants being instructed to perform the task intuitively,
since these neural structures have been suggested to sub-
serve non-conscious, implicit, or intuitive cognitive processes
(called “X-system,” for reﬂexive, by Lieberman). In contrast, for
participants being instructed to perform the task deliberately,
we would expect to see activation within the anterior cingulate
cortex, the prefrontal cortex, and the medial temporal lobe
(including the hippocampus), since these structures have been
suggested to sub-serve conscious, explicit, or rational cognitive
processes (which comprise the so called “C-system,” for reﬂective;
Lieberman, 2007). If, however, a uniﬁed model such as the
adaptive-toolbox framework more closely represents a mapping
of people’s reasoning processes, we would instead expect to ﬁnd
overlapping neural networks, with the intuitive judgment group
additionally activating areas that have been suggested to reﬂect
unconscious cognitive processing. Given previous ﬁndings on
intuitive judgments, especially in the perceptual domain (Bar
et al., 2006; Volz and von Cramon, 2006; Volz et al., 2008; Horr
et al., 2014), we hypothesize these additionally activated areas
to be within the medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), extrastriate
visual areas (BA 19), and infero-temporal cortices. According to
a preliminary neuro-cognitive model of intuition, it is suggested
that the OFC serves as a rapid detector and predictor of potential
content (authenticity, in our case), sending this initial signal
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via extrastriate areas to inferior temporal areas to enable quick,
informed judgments. Furthermore, activation within the anterior
insula may speciﬁcally be observed for intuitive judgments,
given that this area has been suggested as a unique neural
substrate instantiating all subjective feelings (Critchley et al.,
2004; Craig, 2009), thus/therefore possible also (gut) feelings
signaling the outcomes of non-conscious (knowledge-based)
cognitive processes.
Given that neuroimaging is ideally suited to assessing
similarities and diﬀerences on a cognitive level, we utilized
this method as a way to directly test the two opposing
conceptualizations of intuition and deliberation, namely a
dualistic versus a uniﬁed approach. To come one step closer
to a natural setting in which people in their every-day lives in
fact rely on intuitive and/or deliberative judgments, we chose
to veer oﬀ the often chosen path1 of artiﬁcial tasks traditionally
used to probe decision-making. The task we asked participants
to perform is one people perform 1000-fold on a daily basis:
judging the facial expression of people. In this manner, we hope
to come one step closer to gaining an insight into the neural
underpinnings of intuitive and deliberate judgment strategies
employed in a naturalistic setting. (Although we do concede
that interpreting facial expressions “in the wild” would surely be
even more ideal, this is unfortunately rather inconceivable for a
neuro-scientiﬁc investigation.)
We conducted a fMRI study with a between-subject design,
using a task in which participants were shown a series of
happy and fearful facial expressions (of young, middle-aged,
and older males and females); we then asked the participants if
they perceived the expression to be authentic or not. We either
instructed participants to base their judgments on their ﬁrst
impression and gut feeling (group intuitive) or on a deliberate
strategy of taking into account the position of the facial muscles
in the eye and mouth region (group deliberate; see below for
detailed instructions). Focusing on the eye and mouth region
causes participants to attend to the facial features attended to
most (as shown by several eye-tracking studies, e.g., Saether
et al., 2009). Thus, the ﬁxation strategy the deliberate group was
instructed to use was not arbitrary but resembled the natural scan
path of human participants. The direct instruction of decision
mode in a between-subject design follows the methodological
recommendations of leading experts in the ﬁeld (Horstmann
et al., 2009): by using a between-subject design with the same
decision task and dependent variables for both the intuitive and
the deliberate condition, the eﬀect of decision mode can truly be
investigated without carry-over eﬀects. Although decision time is
a characteristic marker of decision mode according to much of
the literature, we refrained from using direct time constraints to
induce automaticity, since this can lead to divided attention in
participants (resulting in introspective questions, such as “How
fast am I this time” or “How much time is left”). Instead, as is
frequently the case in the literature of judgment and decision-
making and also recommended by Horstmann et al. (2009),
1Most of cognitive neuroscience studies exclusively study the neural correlates for
decisions under risk (e.g., lotteries) and imply that understanding these would
lead to an understanding of decision-making in an uncertain world (cp. Volz and
Gigerenzer, 2012).
decision time was used as a marker to check the instruction
manipulation.
(Statistical) Tests designed to compare the theoretical
underpinnings (i.e., uniﬁed model or dual-systems account) of
the intuitive and deliberate judgment processes cannot simply be
based on contrasting the two processes. Such a contrast can only
reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two kinds of judgment
but cannot reveal overlapping activation patterns or gradients of
activation. Thus the crucial analysis to test for a uniﬁed model
or a dual-systems account is a conjunction between the two
judgment groups. A conjunction logic is deﬁned as an “and”
between truth statements (Nichols et al., 2005). In neuroimaging,
this type of analysis reveals brain areas activated in both groups
for the contrasts compared. Since the dual-systems approach
assumes a functional distinction between the two judgment
processes, evidence for the veracity of the dual-systems account
would paradoxically lie in an “empty” conjunction [i.e., no (task-
relevant) brain areas activated by either group]. Conversely,
ﬁnding commonly activated brain areas for both the intuitive
and the deliberate groups would speak against such a model.
Furthermore, since the reaction time (RT) of the participants
can be taken as an objective marker of their adherence to the
instructed judgment strategy, as shown previously (Bolte and
Goschke, 2005; Ahlgrimm and Glöckner, 2009), an analysis
incorporating each participant’s mean RT as indicator of strategy
compliance can be used as a second approach for comparing
qualitative or quantitative diﬀerences in judgments. If diﬀerent
brain areas were activated in each of the two processes, with
the number of areas and the intensity of their activation varying
as a function of speed, we would consider this as evidence
supporting the dual-systems account. That is, fast responding
individuals in the intuitive group would show more activation
foci or more enhanced activation within the X-system, whereas
fast responding individuals in the deliberate group would show
fewer or less activated foci within the C-system (since the dual-
systems account conceptualizes deliberation as a slower process
than intuition).
If the two processes are not inherently distinct but rather
deviate only on certain dimensions (such as consciousness) as
a uniﬁed model would suggest, we might well see the same
or similar kinds of brain areas activated for both processes in
a covariate analysis; with the expansion (i.e., the number of
areas) or the intensity of activation varying as a function of
RT (i.e., strategy adherence). Put diﬀerently, fast responding
individuals in both of the groups would show similar activation
patterns to those of slow responding individuals in both groups.
Additionally, in keeping with the consciousness dimension as
a diﬀerentiating category, we would expect an incorporation
of brain regions known to be important for non-conscious
processing (i.e., medial OFC and anterior insula), for the intuitive
judgment process.
To reiterate, we set out with this work to directly test
the currently held dualistic model of judgment and decision-
making in an everyday type of task, namely the judgment of
the authenticity of facial expressions, via fMRI. We compared
the judgment processes of intuition and deliberation with two
diﬀerently instructed participant groups, subsequently analyzed
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their neural responses in conjunction and covariate analyses, and
also contrasted them directly with each other. We thereby address
the current debate on whether these two processes represent two
separate systems, relying on distinctly diﬀerent neural pathways;
or whether they are rather two sides of a coin, diverging along a
dimension of consciousness.
Materials and Methods
Participants and Instruction
Thirty healthy, right-handed volunteers were included in this
study (14 females; mean age = 26.75, SD = 3.2, range = 22–
39). Two participants (one male, one female) were excluded
from analysis because of technical diﬃculties during scanning.
We obtained informed consent from each participant prior
to the experiment according to the Declaration of Helsinki.
The local ethics committee of the “Charité Universitätsmedizin”
Berlin approved the experimental standards. Data was handled
anonymously. All participants were native German speakers, had
no history of neuropsychiatric disorders, and were not currently
taking psychoactive medications. The behavioral performance
was measured via RT.
Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to the two
instruction conditions: in the intuitive instruction group 14
participants (seven females,mean age 26.4) received the following
instruction:
“Your task is to judge the emotional expression you will see with
regard to its authenticity (realness)...Previous studies have shown
that people are good at judging the authenticity (realness) of a
smiling or fearful expression if they follow their initial feeling,
that is, answer spontaneously and without thinking for too long.
We therefore ask you to make your judgment quickly and most
importantly, to follow your ﬁrst feeling, thus deciding ‘based on
your gut.”’
The term “intuition” was intentionally not used in the
instruction in order to avoid bias eﬀects. In contrast, the
instruction for the 14 participants (six female, mean age 26) in
the deliberate instruction group was as follows:
“Your task is to judge the emotional expression you will see
regarding its authenticity (realness)...Previous studies have shown
that people are good at judging the authenticity (realness) of
a smiling or fearful expression if they analyze and study the
expression well, that is, think about their answer. Therefore,
before you respond, study the expression thoroughly—within the
given time.Most importantly, pay attention to thematching of the
facial muscles in the eye and mouth regions.”
Amajor emphasis of this work was to investigate (intuitive and
deliberate judgments) in an every-day type task setting, as stated
previously. Therefore, although rating the authenticity of facial
expressions may at ﬁrst glance seem ambiguous, this actually very
well-reﬂects the real-life situation: in a natural setting, we very
rarely get feedback about the communicative content of another
person’s expression. Depending on the experiences we’ve had in
our lives (i.e., our social surroundings and upbringing, as well
as our cultural background), we may tend to be very suspicious
and fear that others are deceiving us, or we may tend to be very
trusting and take everything—literally—at “face value.” Ourmain
research question pertains not to the correctness or a person’s
answer but rather diﬀerences in the neural activations of the
two judgment strategies. We therefore decided considered the
importance of a task that was as naturalistic as possible (in an
fMRI study design) high enough to tolerate the trade-oﬀ of using
a somewhat ambiguous question.
Task Outline
In the experimental session, participants were presented with 340
stimuli, showing either a happy or a fearful facial expression,
while their hemodynamic activity was measured (see Figure 1).
Their task was to indicate whether they perceived the facial
expression to be authentic or not (yes/no response assignment
was balanced across participants). Stimuli were taken from the
FACE database established by Ebner et al. (2010). Speciﬁcally, we
presented 170 happy and 170 fearful facial expressions, wherein
gender and age group [“young” (M = 24.2 years, SD = 3.4; range
19–31), “middle-aged” (M = 49.0 years, SD = 3.9; range 39–55),
and “57 years and older” (M = 73.2 years, SD = 2.8; range
69–80) as classiﬁed by Ebner et al., 2010] were balanced across
conditions. Happy and fearful facial expressions were presented
in blocks of 10, resulting in 34 blocks across the entire experiment
(block transition = 6 s). All trials lasted for 6 s (i.e., three scans
at TR = 2 s): after a short ﬁxation (variable duration), the neutral
facial expression of the respective lay actor was shown for 1 s,
followed by the presentation of the emotional facial expression,
which was either shown for a maximum of 2 s, or for as long
as participants took to make their choice (response-dependent
abortion). A ﬁxation cross was presented for the remaining time
of the trial.
We randomly varied the onset of each stimulus presentation
relative to the beginning of the ﬁrst of the three scans in order
to enhance the temporal resolution of the signal captured (Birn
et al., 2002). After the experimental session, participants were
asked to ﬁll in a questionnaire asking how diﬃcult they perceived
the task to be in general, and whether participants found it
diﬃcult to follow the instructed strategy, among other things
FIGURE 1 | Timeline overview of the task design using exemplary
stimuli from the FACES database kindly provided by Ebner et al. (2010).
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(see Table 1 for full questionnaire). Finally, participants were
debriefed and thanked.
MRI Scanning Procedure
Imaging was performed on a 3T scanner (Siemens TrioTim,
Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a standard birdcage head
coil. 17 axial slices [4 mm thickness, 25% spacing, ﬁeld of view
(FOV) 21 cm, data matrix of 64 × 64 voxels, and in-plane
resolution of 3.3 mm × 3.3 mm] covering the whole brain
were acquired using a single-shot spin-echo echo-planar imaging
(SE-EPI) sequence [TR 2 s, echo time (TE) 80 ms, ﬂip angle
90◦] sensitive to blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) contrast.
Two functional runs with 170 time points each were run with
each time point sampling over the 17 slices. Macroscopic ﬁeld
gradients occurring at air-tissue boundaries can cause signal
losses in gradient echo sequencing (Miyapuram et al., 2007).
Therefore, since activity in the OFC was expected and this
area lies near an air-tissue boundary, images were acquired
using a spin echo sequence, achieving a higher signal to noise
ratio (SNR). Furthermore, geometric distortions due to static
magnetic ﬁeld in-homogeneities were characterized by a ﬁeld-
map scan at the end of each session. Additionally, T1-weighted
structural MR images were acquired for the registration of
fMRI data to each participant’s standard anatomical space
(TR = 1550 ms, TE = 2.34 ms, FoV = 244 mm × 244 mm, voxel
size = 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm, interslice gap = 0.5 mm).
Image Processing and Analysis
Functional imaging data was processed and analyzed using
FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) version 5.98, part of
FSL 4.1.9 (FMRIB’s Software Library, http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.
TABLE 1 | Results of the post-session questionnaire.
Question Intuitive group
[%]
Deliberate group
[%]
How difficult was the evaluation of the authenticity of the faces?
Very difficult 71.43 64.29
Moderately difficult 7.14 7.14
Easy 21.43 28.57
Very easy 0 0
Was a specific emotion more difficult?
General 100 100
Happy 100 76.9
Fear 0 23.1
Did one of the presented age groups influence your evaluation?
If so, how?
Yes 50 85.71
Easier for old 57.14 41.67
More difficult for old 42.86 33.33
Older more often authentic 0 25
Was it difficult to follow the instructed strategy?
Very difficult 15.38 57.14
Moderately difficult 7.69 14.29
Easy 76.92 28.57
Answers are presented in terms of % of participants per group.
uk/fsl), and motion-corrected using rigid-body registration to
the central volume (Jenkinson et al., 2002; Woolrich et al.,
2004). The brain extraction tool (BET) was used for extraction
from skull and surrounding tissue (Smith, 2002). To correct
for the temporal oﬀset between the slices acquired in one
scan, a (Hanning-windowed) sinc interpolation was applied.
To remove low frequency signals, a temporal high-pass ﬁlter
with a cut-oﬀ frequency of 1/100 Hz was used. Spatial
smoothing was applied by using a Gaussian ﬁlter with 5 mm
full-width half maximum (FWHM). Registration of the SE-
EPI images to the individual high-resolution structural images
and normalization into standard (MNI) space was performed
using aﬃne registration as implemented in FLIRT (Jenkinson
et al., 2002). To improve the signal quality, especially within
areas aﬀected by susceptibility artifacts, a distortion correction
procedure was applied using FUGUE. In the ﬁrst-level analysis,
by using FILM (FMRIB’s improved linear model), a general linear
model was ﬁtted into pre-whitened data space to account for local
autocorrelations in the fMRI residuals (Woolrich et al., 2001).
The hemodynamic response function was modeled as a gamma
function, with a mean lag of 6 s and SD of 3 s. The events
of interest were each modeled with their temporal derivatives.
For the decision phase, we modeled the presentation of the
emotion-related facial expression as independent events. On the
single-subject level, all stimulus-part categories (i.e., “happy,”
“fearful,” “female,” “male,” “young,” “middle-aged,” and “older”)
were contrasted against the implicit baseline. Z (gaussianized
T/F) statistic images were thresholded using clusters determined
by Z = 2.33 and a (corrected) cluster signiﬁcance threshold
of P = 0.05. Thus the trials were classiﬁed based on objective
stimulus criteria. Subsequently, the resulting contrast-images
were introduced into a ﬁxed-eﬀects model to statistically
concatenate the two diﬀerent runs (Z > 3.09, P = 0.05).
Next, two additional higher-level analyses were conducted. The
ﬁrst was used to deﬁne contrasts for the GLM of the group
analysis. Finally, the third higher-level analysis was performed
as a group analysis. Contrasts were deﬁned testing activations
found in the intuitive group against those of the deliberate
(intuitive versus deliberate) and vice versa (deliberate versus
intuitive), as well as both group activations separately against
baseline (Z > 3.09, P = 0.05). Note that we used a Spin-
Echo (SE)-EPI sequence, which is suﬃciently sensitive for
cognitive studies. Its drawback, however, is a lower statistical
power of the SE-sequences as compared to Gradient-Echo EPI,
corresponding to a reduction in Z scores of about a factor of
three.
Results
Behavioral Results
Our study was conducted with a between-subject design, dividing
participants into group intuitive (n = 14) and group deliberate
(n = 14) based on the instructions they were given (see above).
A manipulation check of strategy induction using decision
times as dependent variable – which has been suggested as
a qualiﬁed method (De Vries et al., 2008; Horstmann et al.,
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2009) – revealed that our instructions successfully induced
intuitive and deliberate decisions. A repeated measure analysis
of variance (rmANOVA) of RTs revealed a main eﬀect of
decision mode [Fgroup (1,26) = 6.94, P = 0.01]. Deciding
was faster in the intuitive [1379 ms, 95% conﬁdence interval
(CI) = 1105–1652; SE = 133.1] than in the deliberate decision
mode (1875 ms, CI = 1601–2148; SE = 133.1). As for the
authenticity judgments themselves, there was no diﬀerence in the
judgments between the intuitive and the deliberate group, i.e.,
the deliberate group did not rate emotional facial expressions as
being more authentic than the intuitive group. This is in line with
behavioral predictions derived from the uniﬁed model theory.
That is, the rates of authenticity judgments did not diﬀer for
single stimuli, or for aggregated groups of stimuli or on average
(see Figure 2).
A post-session questionnaire, in which participants were
asked about their diﬃculties adhering to the instructed strategy,
revealed relevant behavioral diﬀerences. That is, only one
participant from the intuitive instruction group (15.4%) reported
overall diﬃculties with the instruction, but eight participants
from the deliberate group (57.1%) did. This diﬃculty was
reﬂected in their response latencies, as this subset of participants
showed the longest RTs (see Table 1).
Neuroimaging Data
We conducted whole-brain analyses rather than restricting our
view by focusing on speciﬁc regions of interest, since we were
interested in all brain areas activated by the judgment task in
both of the instructed groups,. On the single-subject level, all
stimulus-part categories (dependent variables) were contrasted
against the implicit baseline. Subsequent higher-level analyses
were conducted in two steps, wherein the individual analysis data
were collapsed into group-level contrasts. Thereby, the group-
contrasts consisted of the data of 14 participants per group,
split into 12 variables (happy, fear, female, male, young, middle,
FIGURE 2 | Bar graph of authenticity judgments for both
instruction-groups, based on the combination of categories in the
stimulus material. ffm_a = fear, female, middle, authentic; ffo = fear, female,
old; ffy = fear, female, young; fmm = fear, male, middle; fm0 = fear, male, old;
fmy = fear, male, young; Labels for “happy” = h are analogous to “fear.”
Behavioral data was analyzed using repeated measures analysis of variance
(rmANOVA) in SPSS (SPSS Statistic 20.0, IBM, Chicago, IL, USA), as well as
explorative data analysis. The frequency of behavioral scores (i.e., RT) per cell
was checked for Gaussian distribution to confirm the use of rmANOVA for the
analysis. Missing values were omitted. Error bars mark SEM.
old) with a cluster Z threshold of 3.09 and P = 0.05 using a
ﬁxed-eﬀects model (see Materials and Methods).
Analyses Focusing on Reaction Time (Covariate)
Speed has been shown to be one central characteristic of
intuitive judgments (Bolte and Goschke, 2005; De Vries
et al., 2008; Horstmann et al., 2009). We therefore took
participants’ RTs as indicators of strategy adherence (within
their respective group). Particularly, the faster participants
responded, the more intuitive (in the intuitive group) and
the less deliberate (in the deliberate group) their judgment
strategy was assumed to be. Since the focus of our study was
on judgment processes rather than outputs (the judgments
themselves), utilizing a central process property such as speed
for our analysis was crucial. Accordingly, modeling the RT
as covariate in the group-level fMRI analysis helps to explain
variability in the BOLD signal that is uniquely caused by
cross-subject diﬀerences in strategy adherence and cannot
be accounted for by the other regressors. To reiterate, each
participant’s mean RT was added to the GLM in this analysis.
Contrasts were deﬁned for the group mean activation against
baseline, as well as the positive covariant [1] and the negative
covariant [−1]. Z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were
thresholded using clusters determined by Z > 3.09 and a
(corrected) cluster signiﬁcance threshold of P = 0.05 (Worsley,
2001).
Mean overall activation
The mean activations of the contrast happy versus basline
for the intuitive group is found within visual areas—lingual
gyrus, extrastriate cortex—as well as in the bilateral OFC,
left insula and thalamus, bilateral superior temporal gyrus
(STG)/temporoparietal junction (TPJ), right paracingulate gyrus,
and left precuneus (see Figure 3A, activations depicted in yellow).
For the deliberate group, this analysis revealed mean group
activity in visual areas—middle and inferior occipital gyrus,
occipital fusiform cortex, fusiform gyrus and cuneus—as well
as in the right STG/TPJ, left putamen, right thalamus, and left
angular gyrus (see Figure 3A, activations depicted in green;
see Tables 2 and 3 for complete list of activations). All other
baseline contrasts revealed analogous patterns of activations
(see Figure 4). For this reason, and because our hypotheses
were focused on the between-subject eﬀect rather than the
relative contribution of speciﬁc stimulus-encoded categories
(e.g., emotion, gender), we chose to focus on the “happy”
contrast as representative dependent variable for the subsequent
analyses.
Negative correlation with RT
A unidirectional analysis investigating brain areas that co-varied
negatively with RTs for the intuitive group, revealed extensive
areas of activation encompassing right TPJ, paracingulate gyrus,
precuneus, thalamus, and right OFC, as well as intraparietal
lobula (IPL) and insula, along with areas of visual perception
(supracalcarine cortex, fusiform gyrus). It is interesting to
note that the analogous analysis (negative co-variation) in the
deliberate group exhibited activations in some of the same areas
as the intuitive, namely within right OFC and TPJ, as well as
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Mean group activations: intuitive (yellow): visual areas (lingual
gyrus, extrastriate cortex), bilateral OFC, left insula and thalamus, bilateral
STG/TPJ, right paracingulate gyrus, and left precuneus. Deliberate (green):
visual areas (middle and inferior occipital gyrus, occipital fusiform cortex,
fusiform gyrus, and cuneus), STG/TPJ, putamen, thalamus and angular gyrus.
(B) Activations revealed by the negative covariate (“fast” RT); Intuitive (yellow):
TPJ, paracingulate gyrus, precuneus, thalamus, OFC, intraparietal lobula (IPL).
Deliberate (green): right OFC and temporoparietal regions (TPJ, angular gyrus,
surpamarginal gyrus), lingual gyrus, cuneus. (C) Activations revealed by the
positive covariate (“slow” RTs); Intuitive (yellow): lingual gyrus/extrastriate cortex.
Deliberate (green): visual areas (lingual gyrus, cuneus, inferior lateral occipital
gyrus), middle frontal gyrus.
within primary and extrastriate visual cortices, but also exhibited
activations within dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and
angular gyrus (see Figure 3B).
Positive correlation with RT
The inverse analysis (positive co-variation) in the intuitive group
merely showed activity in the lingual gyrus/extrastriate cortex.
We take the activity pattern for the positive co-variation of
brain activity within the intuitive participants to show that
the people who seemed to adhere less to the instruction —
judging from their longer RTs and their answers to the post-
session questionnaire — relied mostly on brain regions for
visual analysis and did not include the orbitofrontal or temporal
structures previously observed to be elicited for this group (see
also Tables 2 and 3 for areas of activation). The test of brain
regions showing positive co-variation with RTs in the deliberate
group also revealed mostly primary and extrastriate visual areas
(inferior and lateral occipital gyrus, cuneus, and lingual gyrus),
similar to but more extensive than the activation patterns for the
analogous analysis of the intuitive participants (see Figure 3C,
green activations).
Conjunction Analysis
By visual inspection, the two groups show diﬀerent as well as
overlapping activations, the latter being located within posterior-
inferior areas. To be reasonably conﬁdent that these brain regions
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TABLE 2 | Neural activations of the intuitive group as revealed by covariate analysis.
Group mean Hemisphere # Voxels Z-MAX X Y Z
Lingual gyrus (BA 18) bi 11895 8.13 0 −82 8
Insula (BA 13) L 1945 7.18 −34 18 8
Middle frontal gyrus (and OFC; BA 11) L 1114 6.58 −28 44 −14
Superior temporal gyrus L 77 5.59 −52 −26 −2
Middle temporal gyrus L 118 5.3 −60 −26 26
Middle occipital gyrus (extrastriate; BA 18) L 111 5.12 −34 −90 6
Medial frontal gyrus R 381 5.09 4 34 28
Thalamus R 227 5.05 12 −16 8
Superior occipital gyrus (BA 19) L 114 4.95 −34 −84 28
Precuneus L 88 4.82 −14 −58 36
Superior temporal gyurs R 125 4.28 52 −26 −4
Paracingulate gyrus∗ R 79 4.1 2 50 16
Positive covariate (“slow”)
Lingual gyrus L 227 6.58 −10 −98 −2
Negative covariate (“fast”)
Middle frontal gyrus L 464 5.68 −26 44 −14
extending into OFC
Supracalcerine cortex∗ R 564 5.44 2 −84 10
Precentral gyrus (BA 44) R 1286 5.2 48 18 2
Superior frontal gyrus R 495 5.17 22 62 −10
extending into OFC
Middle temporal gyrus L 138 5.06 −48 −64 12
Fusiform gyrus (BA 36) L 80 4.95 −42 −36 −22
Posterior cingulate (BA 30) R 99 4.94 10 −68 12
Supramarginal gyrus R 303 4.88 56 −58 34
Middle frontal gyrus (BA 46) L 225 4.7 −42 46 0
Insula (BA 13) L 73 4.65 −34 18 10
Occipital lobe L 76 4.6 −22 −72 0
OFC (BA 47) L 80 4.53 −40 18 −10
Medial frontal gyrus R 71 4.22 4 50 16
Co-ordinates of activations (in mm) are in MNI Space, labels according to Talairach Daemon Labels, unless indicated by an asterisk. ∗Labels according to the Harvard-
Oxford Structural Atlas. L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; bi, bilateral; BA, Brodmann area.
are activated across decision mode, we calculated a conjunction
analysis of the neural activity revealed for the mean group
activations in the covariate analysis, using the baseline contrast
“happy” for both instruction groups (cp. Nichols et al., 2005).
A conjunction is deﬁned in logic: “If we have two truth
statements A and B, then the conjunction of A and B is true if and
only if both A AND B are true” (Nichols et al., 2005, p. 653). In
neuroimaging terms this means that the conjunction map shows
regions that are commonly activated in the comparison of A and
B. In our study, A and B represent the intuitive and the deliberate
decision mode. By calculating a conjunction analysis between
the group mean results of the baseline contrast of the intuitive
group and those of the deliberate group, we were able to uncover
the areas activated by the task, regardless of instruction, i.e.,
the “common network” for the judgment of the authenticity of
emotional facial expressions across decision mode. This analysis
revealed several clusters of bilateral activity in the fusiform gyrus,
the cuneus, and the inferior occipital gyrus. These all belong
to the classic core system of face perception (e.g., Fusar-Poli
et al., 2009; Atkinson and Adolphs, 2011; see Figure 5). Thus
for both the intuitive and the deliberate group, a commonly
activated brain network was revealed when participants judged
the authenticity of emotional facial expressions.
In summation, both the conjunction and the covariate
analyses revealed (partially) similar regions of activation for both
instruction groups, not two distinctly diﬀerent brain networks
(such as the X- and the C-Systems), as would be predicted by
dual-systems theories.
Direct Contrast Intuitive versus Deliberate
For the sake of completeness, we additionally directly contrasted
the activation pattern of the intuitive group with that of the
deliberate group. According to a dual-systems model, one
would expect to ﬁnd distinct activations in a direct contrast:
activation within the X-system for intuitive as compared to
deliberate decisions, and activation within the C-system for
the inverse contrast. A uniﬁed account, on the other hand,
would only predict diﬀerential activation in areas known to
sub-serve characteristics of intuition such as non-conscious
processing speciﬁcally for the intuitive group. The analysis
was conducted in multiple levels. First, single-subject analysis
GLMs were modeled with seven baseline regressors (“happy,”
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TABLE 3 | Neural activations of the deliberate group as revealed by covariate analysis.
Group mean Hemisphere # Voxels Z-MAX X Y Z
Occipital lobe L 285 7.83 −14 −106 −4
Middle occipital gyrus R 303 6.88 54 −70 −10
Fusiform gyrus (BA 19) L 381 6.14 −42 −70 −14
Superior temporal gyrus (TPJ, BA 13) R 328 6.14 58 −42 22
Inferior occipital gyrus (BA 19) R 160 5.25 44 −78 −2
Insula (BA 13) L 232 4.93 −52 −30 22
Temporal occipital fusiform cortex∗ R 208 4.92 30 −56 −12
Cuneus R 204 4.84 6 −78 16
Putamen L 193 4.81 −26 −8 6
Angular gyrus L 156 4.5 −42 −52 30
Thalamus R 139 4.36 14 −12 8
Positive covariate (“slow”)
Lingual gyrus (BA 18) R 471 8.82 6 −88 −6
Inferior occipital gyrus R 75 7.75 48 −82 −8
Middle frontal gyrus (BA 6) R 228 6.34 46 6 40
Cuneus L 350 5.83 −18 −98 18
Lateral occipital cortex R 90 5.09 36 −88 18
Negative covariate (“fast”)
Occipital lobe L 81 7.73 −14 −106 −4
Superior temporal gyrus (TPJ; BA 13) R 136 5.81 58 −42 22
Angular gyrus∗ L 180 4.65 −42 −52 30
Supramarginal gyrus (BA 40) R 92 4.56 62 −54 24
Putamen L 114 4.51 −28 −8 6
Middle frontal gyrus R 101 4.47 46 38 −16
extending into OFC(BA 47)
Cuneus (BA 18) R 141 4.42 4 −80 18
Lingual gyrus∗ L 74 4.14 −18 −58 −4
Co-ordinates of activations (in mm) are in MNI Space, labels according to Talairach Daemon Labels, unless indicated by an asterisk. ∗Labels according to the Harvard-
Oxford Structural Atlas. L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; bi, bilateral; BA, Brodmann area.
FIGURE 4 | Bar-graph representing the clusters of activation for the
different regressors (i.e., stimulus-part categories). Height of the bars
only indicates activity in this region and is not an indication of amount.
“fearful,” “female,” “male,” “young,” “middle-aged,” “older”)
encoding the stimulus-part categories (i.e., dependent variables),
along with their temporal derivatives. On the next level,
the regressors of the single-subject analyses were deﬁned
as contrasts for the group analysis, allowing subject-level
covariations to be entered into the analysis. The ﬁnal analysis
deﬁned contrasts for the comparison of the instruction groups
(contrasting the activity of the intuitive group with that of
the deliberate one). In a direct contrast of the intuitive
group with the deliberate group in the “happy” condition,
functional activity was revealed in bilateral cuneus (BA 17),
precuneus, bilateral OFC, right fusiform gyrus (BA 18), and
right STG (BA 22; see Figure 6 and Table 4 for areas of
activation). A very similar pattern of activation as revealed
by taking into account those activations elicited when viewing
and judging stimuli depicting a happy expression (“happy”
condition) was also seen for all other dependent variables (see
Figure 4).
The inverse contrast (deliberate versus intuitive group) did
not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerences. This may indicate that
the deliberate judgment strategy is actually a sub-version of
the intuitive one, lacking activations needed for non-conscious
processing. It could also indicate that participants in the
deliberate group showed large inter-individual variability in
processing. The latter assumption may be supported by our post-
session questionnaire data: the deliberate group seems to be
composed of (at least) two subgroups, one of which reported
diﬃculties with the instructed deliberate strategy (57%), and the
other no diﬃculties (43%).
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FIGURE 5 | Neural correlates of the authenticity judgment of happy
facial expressions, for both the intuitive and the deliberate instruction
group, as revealed by conjunction analysis. The “core network” of
authenticity judgments in this task, as compared to baseline activation is shown
through a conjunction of the mean activations in both groups. The blue color of
activations was chosen arbitrarily and is not an indicator of de-activation.
FIGURE 6 | Neural substrates activated when judging happy faces,
contrasting activity of the intuitive versus the deliberate group.
(A) Shows an axial slice view of bilateral activity in anterior portions of the
OFC, (B) shows the activation in the right STG/TPJ (coordinates), and (C)
shows the bilaterally activated cuneus (see Table 4 for co-ordinates).
Discussion
Judging facial expressions is essential for natural social
interactions. These judgments may be intuitive (e.g., in
everyday face-to-face communication); at other times, they
can be achieved by deliberate analysis of the viewed face (e.g.,
when training to recognize deception, as described above).
Whereas dual-systems accounts propose that two qualitatively
and architecturally distinct cognitive processing systems underlie
judgments in one form or another, a uniﬁed approach, such
as the adaptive toolbox, proposes that intuitive and deliberate
judgments rely on the same (or similar) rules, while diﬀering
only along continua of their operating characteristics such as
automaticity, awareness/consciousness, or intention. Our results
diverge from the broadly held view that intuitive and deliberate
judgments are formed via two qualitatively and architecturally
distinct cognitive processing systems. General dual-systems
models assume that various dichotomies (i.e., associative versus
rule-based; automatic versus non-automatic) map onto each
other but importantly, also that the two thus created systems
can operate without the each other (Keren and Schul, 2009).
The results of the conjunction- and covariate analyses as well
as the direct group comparison all speak against this notion.
The following arguments shall clarify this conclusion in more
detail.
Predictions of a Dualistic Paradigm: Two
Distinct Systems
Results of all three analyses (conjunction, covariate, and direct
contrast) speak against predictions derived from the most widely
accepted dual-systems view, according to which we should ﬁnd
distinct neuro-cognitive processing systems (in terms of an
X- and C-system). However, contrary to these dual-systems
predictions, we did not ﬁnd distinct activation patterns – in
terms of an X- and a C-system – for either the direct contrast of
processes, nor for the covariate analyses. All in all, we conclude
that our data do not ﬁt the predictions of a dualistic distinction,
at least in a face judgment paradigm.
Predictions of a Unified Model: A Common
Network with Differential Additions
As stated previously, if the predictions derived from a uniﬁed
model more closely represents a mapping of people’s judgment
and decision-making processes, neural activation patterns could
be expected to show the following characteristics: ﬁrst, an at
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TABLE 4 | Neural activations as revealed by directly contrasting
activations of both groups.
Hemisphere # Voxels Z-MAX X Y Z
Happy
Cuneus L 86 9.39 −6 −104 8
Lingual gyrus (occipital
lobe)
bi 1720 7.38 0 −80 8
Medial frontal gyrus R 736 6.13 20 62 −2
Superior frontal gyrus
(BA 10)
L 271 5.36 −24 62 −16
extending into OFC
Lingual gyrus (BA 18) R 157 5.26 26 −74 −8
[fusiform gyrus∗ ]
Cuneus R 88 5.12 8 −84 34
Superior temporal
gyrus
R 133 4.55 64 −54 14
(BA 22)
Precuneus (BA 7) R 122 4.45 8 −62 42
MNI Space co-ordinates of activations (in mm) in the contrast intuitive > deliberate
for the specified regressor. Labels according to Talairach Daemon Labels, unless
indicated by an asterisk. Clusters shown in descending order of Z-Max values. L,
left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; bi, bilateral. ∗Labels according to the Harvard-
Oxford Structural Atlas.
least partially common network (the regions of which are task
dependent) and second, a potential diﬀerentiation between the
processes, either purely by expansion (more or more highly
activated areas for one strategy as opposed to the other), or
by diﬀerentiation along speciﬁc operating continua, such as
consciousness. We ﬁnd a common network of activation in
the conjunction analysis, comprising the fusiform gyrus, the
cuneus, and the inferior occipital gyrus. Thus both groups
engaged the core areas of face perception (Fusar-Poli et al., 2009;
Atkinson and Adolphs, 2011) and therefore presumably engaged
the same (cognitive) processes when judging the authenticity of
emotional facial expressions. We assume, relying on previously
well-established results on face processing, that participants in
both groups processed second-order relational or conﬁgural cues
(the metric distance between features) in the faces, reﬂected by
activation in inferior occipital gyrus and fusiform gyrus (Rhodes
et al., 2009).
A limitation of our study certainly lies in the higher inter-
group variability within the deliberately instructed participants.
Although individual diﬀerences are tough to control (and actually
constitute valuable components of study), future studies that are
not expecting OFC activations may be better able to deal with
this caveat by raising the global power of the study by measuring
gradient-echo sequences. Seeing as we expected activation of the
OFC for the intuitive group, and because of its proximity to tissue
interfaces this area is known to be susceptible to signal loss caused
by magnetic susceptibility diﬀerences, we needed to employ spin-
echo EPI. Although less sensitive to BOLD functional signal, SE
sequences have been proposed as potentially beneﬁcial option
to obtain increased functional localization to the capillary bed
(Chiacchiaretta and Ferretti, 2015).
However, even though the areas of overlap revealed by the
separate covariate analyses did not survive the conjunction
threshold (presumably due to high variability of the deliberate
group), the tendency for the activation of similar neural
substrates in both of the groups is shown. Furthermore, while
our data cannot wholly support the unimodel predictions as
the “correct” theory, the activations elicited by the direct
probing of intuition and deliberation in our every-day type
task do not map onto the separable and distinct two
systems of judgment in the brain proposed by dual-systems
theorists.
The results of our covariate analyses diverge from dual-
systems predictions, by showing largely overlapping networks
for both the fast and the slow responding individuals in both
instruction groups. In detail, instead of ﬁnding distinct networks
of activation, as would be predicted by a dual-systems account,
our covariate analyses show that for both groups similar neural
substrates are negatively correlated with RT for the processing
of our socially relevant face stimuli, namely regions of primary
visual perception [cuneus (BA 17), lingual gyrus] as well as the
right OFC, fusiform gyrus, and STG/TPJ. That is, the faster
participants’ responded the more these regions were engaged.
In contrast to this, the X-system (i.e., reﬂexive/intuitive) is
proposed to involve the amygdala, basal ganglia, and lateral
temporal cortex, while the C-system (reﬂective/deliberate) is
thought to rely on the activation of anterior cingulate cortex,
the prefrontal cortex, and the medial temporal lobe (Lieberman,
2007).
Based on this divergence and the activation of partially similar
networks regardless the induction of diﬀerential judgment
strategy modes (intuition/deliberation) in our task, we take
these results to indicate that very similar cognitive processes
may underlie the two decision processes. When judging facial
expressions, both seem to be relying on classic areas of face
perception (cuneus, lingual gyrus, and fusiform gyrus) as well
as on areas of the extended face perception network that are
also known to be important for social cognition (OFC and TPJ).
Together with the inferior frontal gyrus and medial and lateral
parts of the OFC, the TPJ has been shown to be involved in
perspective taking during emotional narrative comprehension
(Mano et al., 2009). Furthermore, both the OFC as well as
the TPJ are involved in visual discrimination as well as person
perception and emotional mimicry tasks. It might be that –
in order to intuitively or deliberately judge the authenticity of
emotional facial expressions – people try to take the perspective
of the person they are seeing. In a sense, they might be
trying to “feel what the other person is feeling”—much like the
involvement of somatosensory areas in the viewing of emotional
faces (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). How much of a role
exactly emotional mimicry plays in this task is a question to be
answered in future studies. Thus, these results support the notion
that both intuition and deliberation share a common (neural)
denominator, rather than being architecturally distinct brain
systems as proposed by dual-systems proponents (e.g., Sloman,
2014).
While intuition and deliberation share some of the same
neural structures when judging the authenticity of emotional
faces as presented in this work, some divergent additions to the
common network were shown. Particularly, clusters of activation
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around the TPJ observed in the intuitive group extended into the
posterior part of the STS, which has also been shown to represent
perceived emotions at an abstract, modality-independent level
(Peelen et al., 2010), along with being one of the areas involved in
face perception and communication (Adolphs, 2003; Kanwisher
and Yovel, 2006). Facial mimicry plays a prominent role in the
judgment of another’s facial expression and the simulation of
the perceived emotion in oneself. In what way facial mimicry
might play a role for intuitive processing (but perhaps not
in deliberate one), is a question beyond the purview of the
present study. It would be interesting to investigate whether
a mimicry response might diﬀer between an intuitive and a
deliberate judgment condition. The literature thus far gives
mixed indications for the use of mimicry in the judgment
of genuineness of smiles. Hess et al. (1998) found that just
evoking the notion that expressions may not be genuine, by
asking participants to rate their genuineness, eliminated mimicry
to these expressions. When participants rated the emotion
rather than the genuineness of the same expressions, they
were mimicked. However, Rychlowska et al. (2014) showed that
blocking mimicry compromised the decoding of true and false
smiles. It is therefore unclear if the question of authenticity,
employed in the current work, would evoke mimicry in either an
intuitive or a deliberate condition2. Since the onset of a smile has
been shown to be important in the judgment of this expression
(e.g., Carr et al., 2014), future studies will surely beneﬁt from
the use of dynamic facial expressions and concurrent facial EMG
measurements.
The neural network of the intuitive group additionally
engaged the left OFC, IPL, precuneus and anterior insula
bilaterally, which were not evident in the deliberate group.
Activation within the anterior (agranular) insula – which is
most closely connected to the (medial) OFC – has been
suggested as a “part of a core of a system for evaluating
primary reinforcers and determining appropriate motivational
states – that is, core aﬀect” (Wager and Barrett, 2004, p. 7).
This re-representation of interoception is seen as a possible
basis for the anterior insula’s involvement in subjective (self-
relevant) feelings (Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2009) and thus
may support the “awareness of the immediate moment with
a coherent representation of ‘my feelings’ about ‘that thing”’
(Craig, 2009, p. 65). Thus, the anterior insula via its connection
to the OFC may instantiate the (gut) feeling that we suppose
to arise from the non-conscious cognitive processing being
indicative for the intuitive decision mode. A crucial role for these
non-conscious cognitive processes is assigned to the OFC. This
area has strong reciprocal functional connections to virtually all
sensory modalities: it is a gateway between the limbic system (by
way of a coupling process involving the hypothalamus and the
amygdala) and representational memory (Zald and Rauch, 2006).
This anatomical characteristic may underlie the subconscious
involvement of pre-existing knowledge in intuitive judgments
and decisions of humans—a hallmark of the concept of intuition
2Note, however, that these seeming divergences may be the result of task-induced
diﬀerences. While Hess et al. (1998), asked participants to rate genuineness of
smiles, Rychlowska et al. (2014) presented smiles that had been previously marked
as “true” or “false” and measured mimicry to these pre-rated stimuli.
(Ilg et al., 2007; Volz and Zander, 2014) and may have its eﬀects
via the connection to the anterior insula.
Together, the diﬀerential activation of the bilateral OFC along
with the anterior insula in the intuitive condition may reﬂect the
dimension of non-conscious processing as a distinguishing factor
for intuitive judgment. However, consciousness in the realm
of judgment processes constitutes an operating characteristic
and not a functional characterization of the process itself. This
is of importance, since dual-systems theories often confound
operating principles (i.e., the mental mechanisms that translate
inputs into outputs) with operating characteristics (i.e., the
characteristics of or conditions in which a mental process
operates, e.g., speed, awareness, intention, or control; see
Ferguson et al., 2014; Gawronski et al., 2014 for an overview of
these criticisms). Stating that a process operates in an automatic
or non-automatic fashion simply speciﬁes when the process is
assumed to operate; it does not specify how the process translates
inputs into outputs. Continuous operating characteristics (such
as consciousness) cannot be combined to form two discrete
systems (Ferguson et al., 2014). In fact, two of themost prominent
researchers on conscious and unconscious processing recently
joined forces and proclaimed that: “Whatever we may have
thought and seemed to say in the past, at present we both think
that most human behavior comes from a blend of conscious
and unconscious processes working together to meet the person’s
critical needs and facilitate important goal pursuits” (Baumeister
and Bargh, 2014). Conceptually, intuition is often associated with
an (evolutionarily) “old” system in the brain that is thought to
be engaged automatically and non-consciously. However, when
we speak of non-conscious processing here, we are not referring
to reﬂexive behavior, which occurs without conscious awareness
of the acting agent. We use the term non-conscious to refer
to the observation that people are not, or only partly aware of
the cognitive processes underlying their judgment, in the sense
that they cannot report on them. For instance, they cannot
report on the cues they are using or on the way in which these
cues are processed (cp. Volz and Zander, 2014). We refer to
the conceptualization of intuition which assumes that people –
when engaged in intuitive processing – act based on a strong
“feeling” (see Proust, 2015 on the structure and function of
these feelings) without being able to consciously reason about
the origin of this feeling or the cognitive basis thereof (Glöckner
and Witteman, 2010; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011). In other
words, the non-conscious processing (of which the decision
maker is unaware) takes eﬀect through consciously experienced
signals [such as “feeling of rightness” (Thompson et al., 2011)
or “feeling of (processing) ﬂuency” (related to intuition; see,
e.g., Dijkstra et al., 2014)], which are colloquially denoted as gut
feelings.
We therefore take the ﬁnding of similar neural substrates
(right OFC and TPJ, along with core areas of face perception)
in both groups for the judgment of emotional facial expressions,
as well as the expansion of activation within area’s known
to be involved in mentalizing and unconscious processing in
the intuitive condition (bilateral OFC and anterior Insula), to
contradict popular dual-systems accounts that propose a clear-
cut dichotomy of “two distinct systems in the brain that
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serve complementary functions” (Sloman, 2014). The intuitive
decision-maker may not be aware of the reason for deciding in
a particular way, but has a strong feeling for deciding that way.
We thus believe the anterior insula activation to be at the core of
the awareness of the subjective feeling leading the decision-maker
to her (intuitive) judgment.
To summarize, we would tentatively suggest that the present
work does not match the neural predictions derived from a dual-
systems model. Our results seem rather in support a uniﬁed
model according to which judging intuitively or deliberately
both rely on similar or same mental processes following similar
processing rules, while diﬀerentially engaging divergent mental
structures to support (continuous) operating characteristics.
As the unimodel suggests, any rule can be easier (or more
diﬃcult) to process, used consciously or non-consciously, and
its use is not determined by the operation of one distinct
system over another but rather the amount of available resources
(motivational, cognitive, etc.; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011).
Further support for this view comes from Huang and Bargh’s
(2014) proposal that both conscious and unconscious processes
may operate on the basis of the same mental structures involving
the same mental operations.
Non-verbal signals such as facial expressions have repeatedly
been shown to be critical in the shaping of social behavior (e.g.,
Critchley et al., 2000) and are “among the most informative
stimuli we ever perceive” (Tsao and Livingstone, 2008). The
social complexity hypothesis posits that as social structures grow
in complexity, so does the need for more complex forms of
cognition and communication. A notion of duality – whether it
be the general notion of dual systems or the more speciﬁc notion
of dual-processes (cp. Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Evans and
Stanovich, 2013, for example) has certainly been a great catalyst
for the production of a plethora of scientiﬁc evidence, especially
in decision science, social psychology and (neuro-)economics.
Whether these dualisms can truly be applied to explain all of the
complexity that is necessitated by life in social structures remains
to be seen. For the judgment of faces, at least, the story might be
a less dualistic one.
To our knowledge, this work is the ﬁrst to directly instruct
intuitive and deliberative modes in a face judgment task in order
to probe the mental mechanisms underlying these processes. It
would certainly be interesting to try to extend these ﬁndings
to a greater population, by employing a larger sample size and
utilizing a random eﬀects analysis. Perhaps by increasing the
sample size, one might be able to directly investigate sub-groups
forming within the deliberate group (as seen from the high
inter-group variability in the deliberate condition in the present
study) and compare these to an intuitive strategy. Our study
can therefore only provide a ﬁrst stepping stone, for the further
development of direct probing into the neural basis of intuitive
and deliberative (face) judgments.
Acknowledgments
We thank Dominik Wagner for his help in acquiring the
fMRI data and Kerstin Flake for invaluable support with ﬁgure
preparations. This research was supported by the Werner
Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience (CIN) at the
Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen. The CIN is an Excellence
Cluster funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)
within the framework of the Excellence Initiative (EXC 307). This
work was supported by the open-access publishing fund of the
University of Tuebingen.
References
Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 4, 165–178. doi: 10.1038/nrn1056
Ahlgrimm, A., and Glöckner, A. (2009). How distinct are intuition and
deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction-induced decision modes.
Judgm. Decis. Mak 4, 335–354.
Atkinson, A. P., and Adolphs, R. (2011). The neuropsychology of face perception:
beyond simple dissociations and functional selectivity. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B
Biol. Sci. 366, 1726–1738. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0349
Bar, M., Kassam, K. S., Ghuman, A. S., Boshyan, J., Schmid, A. M., Schmidt, A. M.,
et al. (2006). Top-down facilitation of visual recognition. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U. S. A. 103, 449–454. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0507062103
Baumeister, R. F., and Bargh, J. A. (2014). “Conscious and unconscious: toward
an integrative understanding of human mental life and action,” in Dual-Process
Theories of the Social Mind, eds J. W. Sherman, B. Gawronski, and Y. Trope
(New York, NY: The Guilford Press), 35–49.
Birn, R. M., Cox, R. W., and Bandettini, P. A. (2002). Detection versus estimation
in event-related fMRI: choosing the optimal stimulus timing. Neuroimage 51,
252–264. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.0964
Bolte, A., and Goschke, T. (2005). On the speed of intuition: intuitive judgments
of semantic coherence under diﬀerent response deadlines. Mem. Cogn. 33,
1248–1255. doi: 10.3758/BF03193226
Carr, E. W., Korb, S., Niedenthal, P. M., and Winkielman, P. (2014). The two sides
of spontaneity: movement onset asymmetries in facial expressions inﬂuence
social judgments. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 55, 31–36. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2014.
05.008
Chaiken, S., and Trope, Y. (1999). Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Chiacchiaretta, P., and Ferretti, A. (2015). Resting state BOLD functional
connectivity at 3T: spin echo versus gradient echo EPI. PLoS ONE 10:e0120398.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0120398
Craig, A. D. (2009). How do you feel—now? The anterior insula and human
awareness. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10, 59–70. doi: 10.1038/nrn2555
Critchley, H. D., Daly, E. M., Bullmore, E. T., Williams, S. C., Van Amelsvoort,
T., Robertson, D. M., et al. (2000). The functional neuroanatomy of
social behaviour: changes in cerebral blood ﬂow when people with autistic
disorder process facial expressions. Brain 123(Pt. 11), 2203–2212. doi:
10.1093/brain/123.11.2203
Critchley, H. D., Wiens, S., Rotshtein, P., Ohman, A., and Dolan, R. J. (2004).
Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 189–195.
doi: 10.1038/nn1176
De Vries, M., Holland, R. W., and Witteman, C. L. M. (2008). Fitting decisions:
mood and intuitive versus deliberative decision strategies. Cogn. Emot. 22,
931–943. doi: 10.1080/02699930701552580
Dijkstra, K. A., van der Pligt, J., and van Kleef, G. A. (2014). Eﬀects of processing
style on responsiveness to aﬀective stimuli and processing ﬂuency. Cogn. Emot.
28, 959–970. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2013.865597
Ebner, N. C., Riediger,M., and Lindenberger, U. (2010). FACES–a database of facial
expressions in young, middle-aged, and older women and men: development
and validation. Behav. Res. Methods 42, 351–362. doi: 10.3758/BRM.
42.1.351
Ekman, P. (2006). Darwin, deception, and facial expression. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci.
1000, 205–221. doi: 10.1196/annals.1280.010
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 13 August 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 456
Mega et al. Probing intuitive/deliberative judgment strategies
Evans, J. S. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment,
and social cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 255–278. doi:
10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629
Evans, J. S. B. T., and Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher
cognition: advancing the debate. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 8, 223–241. doi:
10.1177/1745691612460685
Ferguson, M. J., Mann, T. C., and Wojnowicz, M. T. (2014). “Rethinking duality:
criticisms and ways forward,” in Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind, eds
J. W. Sherman, B. Gawronski, and Y. Trope (New York, NY: The Guildford
Press), 578–594.
Fusar-Poli, P., Placentino, A., Carletti, F., Landi, P., Allen, P., Surguladze, S., et al.
(2009). Functional atlas of emotional faces processing: a voxel-based meta-
analysis of 105 functional magnetic resonance imaging studies. J. Psychiatry
Neurosci. 34, 418–432.
Gawronski, B., Sherman, J. W., and Trope, Y. (2014). “Two of what? a conceptual
analysis of dual process theories,” in Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind,
eds J. W. Sherman, B. Gawronski, and Y. Trope (New York, NY: Guilford
Publications), 3–19.
Gigerenzer, G., Hertwig, R., and Pachur, T., (eds). (2011). Heuristics: The
Foundations of Adaptive Behavior. New York: Oxford University Press. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744282.001.0001
Glöckner, A., and Witteman, C. (2010). “Foundations for tracing intuitions.
Models, ﬁndings, categorizations,” in Foundations for Tracing Intuition:
Challenges and Methods, eds A. Glöckner and C. Witteman (New York, NY:
Psychology Press), 1–23.
Goldstein, D. G., and Gigerenzer, G. (2009). Fast and frugal forecasting. Int. J.
Forecast. 25, 760–772. doi: 10.1016/j.ijforecast.2009.05.010
Hess, U., Philippot, P., and Blairy, S. (1998). Facial reactions to emotional
facial expressions: aﬀect or cognition? Cogn. Emot. 12, 509–531. doi:
10.1080/026999398379547
Horr, N. K., Braun, C., and Volz, K. G. (2014). Feeling before knowing
why: the role of the orbitofrontal cortex in intuitive judgments-an MEG
study. Cogn. Aﬀect. Behav. Neurosci. 14, 1271–1285. doi: 10.3758/s13415-014-
0286
Horstmann, N., Hausmann, D., and Ryf, S. (2009). “Methods for inducing
intuitive and deliberate processingmodes,” in Foundations for Tracing Intuition:
Challenges and Methods, eds A. Glöckner and C. Witteman (New York, NY:
Taylor & Francis), 219–237.
Huang, J. Y., and Bargh, J. A. (2014). The selﬁsh goal: autonomously
operating motivational structures as the proximate cause of human judgment
and behavior. Behav. Brain Sci. 37, 121–135. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X13
000290
Ilg, R., Vogeley, K., Goschke, T., Bolte, A., Shah, J. N., Pöppel, E., et al.
(2007). Neural processes underlying intuitive coherence judgments as revealed
by fMRI on a semantic judgment task. Neuroimage 38, 228–238. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.07.014
Jenkinson, M., Bannister, P., Brady, M., and Smith, S. (2002). Improved
optimization for the robust and accurate linear registration and motion
correction of brain images. Neuroimage 17, 825–841. doi: 10.1006/nimg.
2002.1132
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping
bounded rationality. Am. Psychol. 58, 697–720. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.58.
9.697
Kanwisher, N., and Yovel, G. (2006). The fusiform face area: a cortical region
specialized for the perception of faces. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci.
361, 2109–2128. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2006.1934
Keren, G., and Schul, Y. (2009). Two is not always better than one. a critical
evaluation of two-systems theories. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 4, 533–550. doi:
10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01164.x
Kruglanski, A. W., and Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Intuitive and deliberate
judgments are based on common principles. Psychol. Rev. 118, 97–109. doi:
10.1037/a0020762
Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: a review of core processes.
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 58, 259–289. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.
085654
Lieberman, M. D., Gaunt, R., and Gilbert, D. T. (2002). Reﬂection and reﬂexion:
a social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. Adv. Exp.
Soc. Psychol. 34, 199–249. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.12.004
Mano, Y., Harada, T., Sugiura, M., Saito, D. N., and Sadato, N. (2009).
Perspective-taking as part of narrative comprehension: a functional MRI
study. Neuropsychologia 47, 813–824. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.
12.011
McClure, S. M., Laibson, D. I., Loewenstein, G., and Cohen, J. D. (2004). Separate
neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards. Science 306,
503–507. doi: 10.1126/science.1100907
Miyapuram, K. P., Tobler, P. N., Osterbauer, R., and Schwarzbauer, C. (2007).
“Imaging brain regions with susceptibility-induced signal losses using gradient
and spin echo techniques spin-echo sequences for reducing,” in Proceedings
of the 31st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Amsterdam,
218–223.
Nichols, T., Brett, M., Andersson, J., Wager, T., and Poline, J. B. (2005). Valid
conjunction inference with the minimum statistic. Neuroimage 25, 653–660.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.12.005
Peelen, M. V., Atkinson, A. P., and Vuilleumier, P. (2010). Supramodal
representations of perceived emotions in the human brain. J. Neurosci. 30,
10127–10134. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2161-10.2010
Proust, J. (2015). “The representational structure of feelings,” in OpenMIND,
eds T. Metzinger and J. M. Windt (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group). doi:
10.15502/9783958570047
Rhodes, G., Michie, P. T., Hughes, M. E., and Byatt, G. (2009). The fusiform
face area and occipital face area show sensitivity to spatial relations
in faces. Eur. J. Neurosci. 30, 721–733. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2009.
06861.x
Rizzolatti, G., and Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annu.
Rev. Neurosci. 27, 169–192. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.
144230
Rychlowska, M., Cañadas, E., Wood, A., Krumhuber, E. G., Fischer, A.,
and Niedenthal, P. M. (2014). Blocking mimicry makes true and false
smiles look the same. PLoS ONE 9:e90876. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.
0090876
Saether, L., Van Belle, W., Laeng, B., Brennen, T., and Øvervoll, M. (2009).
Anchoring gaze when categorizing faces’ sex: evidence from eye-tracking data.
Vision Res. 49, 2870–2880. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2009.09.001
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychol. Bull.
119, 3–22. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3
Sloman, S. A. (2014). “Two systems of reasoning - an update,” in Dual-Process
Theories of the Social Mind, (New York, NY: Guilford Press), 107–120.
Smith, S. M. (2002). Fast robust automated brain extraction.Hum. Brain Mapp. 17,
143–155. doi: 10.1002/hbm.10062
Stanovich, K. E., and West, R. F. (2000). Individual diﬀerences in reasoning:
implications for the rationality debate? Behav. Brain Sci. 23, 645–665. doi:
10.1017/S0140525X00003435
Strack, F., and Deutsch, R. (2004). Reﬂective and impulsive determinants of social
behavior. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 8, 220–247. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., and Pennycook, G. (2011).
Intuition, reason, and metacognition. Cogn. Psychol. 63, 107–140. doi:
10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001
Tsao, D. Y., and Livingstone, M. S. (2008). Mechanisms of face perception.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 31, 411–437. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.30.051606.
094238
Volz, K. G., and Gigerenzer, G. (2012). Cognitive processes in decisions under risk
are not the same as in decisions under uncertainty. Front. Neurosci. 6:105. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2012.00105
Volz, K. G., Rubsamen, R., and von Cramon, Y. D. (2008). Cortical regions
activated by the subjective sense of perceptual coherence of environmental
sounds: a proposal for a neuroscience of intuition.Cogn. Aﬀect. Behav. Neurosci.
8, 318–328. doi: 10.3758/CABN.8.3.318
Volz, K. G., and von Cramon, Y. D. (2006). What neuroscience can tell about
intuitive processes in the context of perceptual discovery. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 18,
2077–2087. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.12.2077
Volz, K. G., and Zander, T. (2014). Primed for intuition? Neurosci. Decis. Mak. 1,
26–34. doi: 10.2478/ndm-2014-0001
Wager, T. D., and Barrett, L. F. (2004). From aﬀect to control: Functional
specialization of the insula in motivation and regulation. Emotion 129, 2865.
Woolrich, M. W., Behrens, T. E. J., Beckmann, C. F., Jenkinson, M.,
and Smith, S. M. (2004). Multilevel linear modelling for FMRI group
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 14 August 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 456
Mega et al. Probing intuitive/deliberative judgment strategies
analysis using Bayesian inference. Neuroimage 21, 1732–1747. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.12.023
Woolrich, M. W., Ripley, B. D., Brady, J. M., and Smith, S. M. (2001). Temporal
autocorrelation in univariate linear modeling of FMRI data. Neuroimage 14,
1370–1386. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2001.0931
Worsley, K. J. (2001). “Statistical analysis of activation images,” in Functional MRI:
An Introduction to Methods, eds P. Jezzard, P. M. Matthews, and S. M. Smith
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Zald, D. H., and Rauch, S. L. (2006). The Orbitofrontal Cortex. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Mega, Gigerenzer and Volz. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 15 August 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 456
